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“The employment class action waiver affected me emotionally as I felt powerless in the 
organization.  I felt isolated from others [and] that indirectly affected my performance.  I was 
unable to focus on my job properly.  I felt as if I was used as mere[ly] [a] prop in the 
organization with no powers.  The waiver prevented me from pursuing a claim against my 
employer [and] that caused a lot of trouble for me.”  – Software Engineer1 
 
“[Because of the waiver], I am no longer able to get justice if I am wronged... I was not 
able to obtain necessary uniforms, and the waiver prevented me from taking my employer to 
court.”  – Security Officer2 
 
“At first... I fe[lt] that the employer wanted to control the employee’s legal advantage.  I felt 
somewhat weak in my position as an employee.”  – IT Analyst3 
 
INTRODUCTION 
If an employer steals a group of employees’ wages, those employees are free to file a 
group-action4 lawsuit at the local courthouse to recover those wages.  However, by contractual 
agreement, some employers require their employees to individually arbitrate their employment 
claims.  These agreements, what this article refers to as compulsory group-action waivers, 
																																								 																				
1 Response to an online survey the author conducted on April 12, 2016 (on file with author) (hereinafter referred to 
as “Survey”).  
2 Id. 
3 Id. (in response to questions about the effect an employment class action waiver had on his relationship with the 
employer).  The analyst made this comment after first noting that the waiver had little effect on him personally 
because the employer paid him a large amount of money.  However, the analyst went on to clarify, “If I was paid 
less, I may feel different.” 
4 When I refer to “group-action” I mean any type of employment-based court action on behalf of a relatively large 
number of individuals.  This could be a Rule 23 class action, a Fair Labor Standards Act Collective Action, or a 
California Private Attorney General Action.	
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support the view that “the strong do as they can, while the weak suffer what they must.”5  Here, 
the “strong” employer requires the employee to sign away her right to join co-workers and 
publicly sue the employer.  The waiver makes the employee “weak” through alienation – a 
concept refined and examined by sociologists, psychologists, theologians, and philosophers6 – by 
decreasing the employee’s power, meaning, community, and self-actualization in the workplace 
and society. 
To understand how waivers alienate employees, consider this hypothetical.  Mary, an 
immigrant housekeeper at a large hotel, unwittingly signs an employment arbitration agreement 
that includes a class action waiver.  Throughout the 10 years she works at the hotel, she never 
receives her legally required rest breaks and management often forces her to work off the clock.  
Further, the hotel systematically discriminates against her because of her gender by refusing to 
promote her into leadership positions.  After finding out that other housekeepers are suffering in 
similar ways, she decides to join with her co-workers and file a class action lawsuit.  However, 
because she signed the class action waiver at the start of her employment, the employer forces 
her to resolve these claims through individual arbitration.  Because arbitrating individual claims 
is not very lucrative, attracting competent attorneys becomes increasingly difficult.  
Consequently, Mary finds herself in a situation with less than adequate representation.  To make 
matters worse, the employer handpicked the arbitrator, and the arbitrator has an existing working 
relationship with the employer.7   
 In effect, the class action waiver serves to alienate Mary from her work and from society 
more generally.  For example, the waiver strips Mary of her power to influence decision making 
																																								 																				
5 THUCYDIDES, THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR (1910), 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0200:book=5:chapter=89:section=1.    
6 See RABINDRA N. KANUNGO, WORK ALIENATION: AN INTEGRATIVE APPROACH 7-57 (1982) (discussing how 
scholars in the fields of philosophy, theology, sociology, and psychology approach alienation).  
7 See Part I.B.1 for a description of how unfair and biased certain types of arbitration can be.		
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in the company, as she cannot utilize the courts to join with other employees to resolve her 
claim.  Further, the waiver belittles Mary’s meaning and worth within the company – the waiver 
furthers the notion that Mary is merely a potential liability and not a valued employee.  Mary is 
also isolated from her fellow employees and the courts because she cannot join her co-workers to 
ask the courts for help.  All of these effects result in self-estrangement, a condition where Mary 
is more likely to work for external satisfaction rather than for the intrinsic value of the work 
itself.  This often means that Mary will work just to get her paycheck at the end of the week and 
not because she genuinely enjoys her job.  David Gregory described the alienated worker 
eloquently:  
A profound malaise of spirit afflicts many workers.  Misery, meaninglessness, 
deep dissatisfaction, and often unarticulable impoverishment of purpose plague 
even many of the most "successful," especially if "success" is measured only by 
conventional norms of monetary remuneration in late capitalist society.  It has 
long been axiomatic that most persons who work for a living, as distinguished 
from those peculiarly driven to "live to work," dread Monday morning.8 
  
Gregory’s description of an alienated worker could easily apply to Mary.  The waiver 
further reinforces Mary’s feelings of powerlessness, meaninglessness, isolation, and self-
estrangement.   
There is ample scholarship discussing whether employment group-action waivers in 
arbitration agreements should be lawful.9  This article adds to that scholarship by presenting an 
additional reason why courts should find these waivers unlawful.  The thrust of the policy 
argument is that employment group-action waivers in arbitration agreements, in practice, alienate 
employees by decreasing their power, meaning, community, and self-actualization within society 
and within the workplace.  Thus, a court should not enforce them.  To be clear, this article does 
																																								 																				
8 David L. Gregory, Catholic Labor Theory and the Transformation of Work, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 119, 122 
(1988).  
9 See e.g., Catherine L. Fisk, Collective Actions and Joinder of Parties in Arbitration: Implications of DR Horton 
and Concepcion, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. (2015); Michael D. Schwartz, A Substantive Right to Class 
Proceedings: The False Conflict Between the FAA and NLRA, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2945 (2013).	
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not argue that a court should blindly consider and adopt employee alienation as dispositive in its 
analysis.  No, not at all.  Rather, a court should consider employee alienation as part of its 
analysis because the inquiry falls directly in line with the goals of the national labor policy in the 
United States.  Through the alleviation of alienation, a court is furthering labor policy.  
Moreover, judges are interested in the practical effects of their decisions and often want to find 
the more sympathetic reading of a contested legal issue.  
The principle argument of this article assumes employee alienation ought to be avoided.  
There are those that view work as merely “toil and trouble”10—where work is simply a daily 
struggle and only a means to an end.  To the contrary, this article ascribes to the views of John 
Stuart Mill and Karl Marx in that work ought to be inherently fulfilling and should have intrinsic 
worth.11  Alienation, as will be described in Part I, is the opposite of that fulfillment.  It is the 
lack of self-actualization, autonomy, and meaning.  It is the isolation of the worker.   
This article proceeds in three parts.  Part I provides introductory information on employee 
alienation, examines the alienating effects of group-action waivers generally, and points to three 
reasons why alienation is important to the legal analysis of cases in this area.  Part II explains the 
various elements of the alienation inquiry.  In particular, it examines how waiving the right to 
participate in three different types of group-actions alienates the employee to differing degrees.  
These three types are Rule 23 class actions, Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) collective 
actions, and California Private Attorney General Act (“PAGA”) actions.  Part III concludes with 




10 John Dupré & Regenia Gagnier, A Brief History of Work, 30 J. ECON. ISSUES 553 (1996) (quoting Adam Smith). 
11 Id. at 554 (describing Marx’s view of work that it can bring about the “full humanity of the individual,” and 
describing Mill’s view that “work is aimed at self-fulfillment”).	
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I. CATEGORIES OF EMPLOYEE ALIENATION AND WHY ALIENATION MATTERS 
 Alienation can be divided into four different categories: powerlessness, meaninglessness, 
isolation, and self-estrangement.  Powerlessness is defined as the lack of autonomy or control.  
Meaninglessness is characterized by a worker’s inability to predict the future and the subsequent 
inability of an employee to conceptualize her function in the workplace.  Isolation is where an 
employee feels a general lack of community or support.  Finally, self-estrangement is the lack of 
self-actualization, meaning that an employee sees work as merely a means to an end rather than 
an end in and of itself.   
Group-action waivers bring these alienating effects into the workplace.  This article 
assesses how all types of group-action waivers alienate through stealing power, meaning, 
community, and self-actualization from employees.   
Finally, this part closes by examining why employee alienation matters to the legal 
world.  This article contends that an alienation inquiry falls directly in line with the goals of our 
national labor policy, in particular, the National Labor Relations Act – an act that provides 
employees the right to organize into unions and take certain collective actions to obtain better 
terms and conditions in the workplace.12  Furthermore, alienation is significant because judges 
care about the practical effects of their decisions and because using it as an analytical tool helps 
judges find more sympathetic interpretations of contested legal issues.   
A. Categories of Employee Alienation  
The notion of alienation has existed in the academic discourse for hundreds of years.13  It 
also appears in different fields of inquiry.  In theology, alienation is human’s isolation from 
																																								 																				
12 See 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-169. 
13 RABINDRA N. KANUNGO, WORK ALIENATION: AN INTEGRATIVE APPROACH 8 (1982) (noting that a scholar 
“pointed out that social alienation as an observed phenomenon is quite ancient....”). 
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God.14  In property law, alienation can mean the transfer of ownership of property.15  To Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, alienation meant surrendering power to the general will.16  Melvin Seeman, a 
prominent sociologist, broke up the theory of alienation into five distinct categories: 
powerlessness, meaninglessness, isolation, normlessness, and self-estrangement.17  Robert 
Blauner, another sociologist, slightly refined Seeman’s categories and then applied them to the 
industrial workplace.18  While Blauner’s classification is almost identical to Seeman’s, it only 
contains four categories: powerlessness, meaninglessness, isolation, and self-estrangement.19  
This section focuses on those four variants of alienation and attempts to define them.  This article 
will draw from different sociologists’ definitions of the terms.    
1. Powerlessness: “I lack control” 
 The first category of alienation is powerlessness.  Powerlessness occurs when a worker 
lacks the ability to influence outcomes in the workplace, politics, or society.20  Other scholars 
have described powerlessness as a lack of participation and autonomy21 or as the feeling of 
domination by people or a system.22  Melvin Seeman, who first organized alienation into 
different categories, recognized powerlessness as originating from the work of Karl Marx.23  
Marx saw the owners of capitalistic enterprises alienating the worker by taking away the 
worker’s means of decision-making decisions and the worker’s privileges.24    
																																								 																				
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 9. 
16 Id. at 11. 
17 Id. at 24.  See also Melvin Seeman, On the Meaning of Alienation, 24 AMER. SOCIO. REV. 783 (Dec. 1959). 
18 See generally ROBERT BLAUNER, ALIENATION AND FREEDOM: THE FACTORY WORKER AND HIS INDUSTRY (1964); 
see also Kanungo, supra note 13, at 24.	
19 See generally BLAUNER, supra note 18. 
20 Melvin Seeman, On the Meaning of Alienation, 24 AMER. SOCIO. REV. 783, 785 (Dec. 1959). 
21 Blake E. Ashforth, The Experience of Powerlessness in Organization, 43 ORG. BEH. & HUMAN DEC. PROC. 207, 
207 (1989).  
22 Thomas G. Cummings & Susan L. Manring, The Relationship between Worker Alienation and Work-Related 
Behavior, 10 J. VOC. BEHAVIOR 169 (1977). 
23 Seeman, supra note 20, at 784.  See also RABINDRA N. KANUNGO, WORK ALIENATION: AN INTEGRATIVE 
APPROACH 24-25 (1982) (“[Powerlessness] was the primary concern of Marx while dealing with labor alienation.”) 
24 Seeman, supra note 20, at 784.  
8 
	
2. Meaninglessness: “I lack importance” 
 The second category of alienation is meaninglessness.  Melvin Seeman describes 
meaninglessness as “a low expectancy that satisfactory predictions about future outcomes of 
behavior can be made.”25  In other words, the world is unintelligible.26  Kanungo notes that 
meaninglessness “should be characterized in terms of incomprehensibility or inability to 
understand one’s complex environment.”27  As Blauner interprets the term, meaninglessness 
occurs when an employee does not see the function, purpose, or importance of their activity.28  
The opposite of meaningless is when the employee fully realizes the extent of her actions and 
how those actions align with the company’s goals.29  In other words, the employee views herself 
and her contributions to the company as something more than a mere cog in a wheel. 
3. Isolation: “I lack community” 
 Isolation is the third category of alienation.  It occurs when the employee lacks 
connection or association in a social system.30 Blauner describes isolation as “the feeling of 
being in, but not of, society, a sense of remoteness from the larger social order . . . ”31   
4. Self-Estrangement: “I lack self-actualization” 
 The final variant of alienation that this article will discuss is self-estrangement.  Self-
estrangement is an “elusive idea.”32  Nonetheless, it can be summed up as the lack of inherent 
meaning or pride in work.33  An example of self-estrangement occurs when an employee merely 
																																								 																				
25 Id. at 786 (italics redacted). 
26 Id. 
27 RABINDRA N. KANUNGO, WORK ALIENATION: AN INTEGRATIVE APPROACH 26 (1982).  
28 See ROBERT BLAUNER, ALIENATION AND FREEDOM: THE FACTORY WORKER AND HIS INDUSTRY 26 (1964).		
29 See id. 
30 Kanungo, supra note 27, at 27. 
31 See BLAUNER, supra note 28, at 32. 
32 Melvin Seeman, The Urban Alienation: Some Dubious Theses from Marx to Marcuse, 19 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOCIAL PSY. 135, 136 (1971). 
33 Id. at 790. 
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works for her paycheck at the end of the week and not for the intrinsic value of her job.34  Often, 
self-estrangement occurs due to a combination of powerlessness, meaninglessness, and isolation.  
For instance, if an employee lacks control, importance, and community in the workplace or 
society in general, her work is more likely to only be an activity to satisfy external needs rather 
than rewarding in itself.35  Self-estrangement disrupts the employee’s experience of time.36  This 
is because self-estrangement causes the focus to be the future end rather than the present job.37   
B. Group-Action Waivers in General 
 Having identified the categories of alienation, this article will apply the framework to 
group-action waivers.  This section views group-action waivers generally through the lens of 
employee alienation.  The inquiry goes through the four categories of alienation: powerlessness, 
meaninglessness, isolation, and self-estrangement.    
 1. Powerlessness 
 Precluding the employee from utilizing group-action reduces the employee’s power.  
This is obvious.  Without the waiver, an employee has the ability to influence outcomes in the 
workplace through both group-action and the judiciary.  With the waiver, this influence and 
control is gone. This article acknowledges that an employee could very well still pursue a claim 
using arbitration without the backing or support of other employees, as waivers often require.  
However, this avenue is deficient for three reasons.  First, arbitration will likely be unfair to the 
																																								 																				
34 See id. (“...the worker who works merely for his salary, the housewife who cooks simply to get it over with, or the 
other-directed type who acts “only for its effect on others” – all these (at different levels, again) are instances of self-
estrangement.”).  
35 See e.g., Kanungo, supra note 4, at 28; BLAUNER, supra note 28, at 3 (“When work activity does not permit 
control (powerlessness), evoke a sense of purpose (meaninglessness), or encourage larger identification (isolation), 
employment becomes simply a means of making a living.”).	
36 BLAUNER, supra note 28, at 32 (“Self-estrangement is based on a rupture in the temporal continuity of experience.  
When activity becomes a means to an end, rather than an end in itself, a heightened awareness of time results from a 
split between present engagements and future consideration.”). 
37 Id.  
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employee and biased in favor of the employer.38  Part of the reason is that arbitrators may feel 
bound to the companies that hire them for fear of losing their business in the future.39  
Additionally, companies often pay employees for their favorable testimony.40  Moreover, 
arbitrators have been known to misconstrue or simply disregard the law to give a favorable 
ruling for the company.41  In the arbitration setting, rules of evidence often do not apply,42 and 
conflicts of interest flourish.43  Overall, employees are at an inherent disadvantage: “Why would 
an arbitrator cater to a person they will never see again?” said Victoria Pynchon, an arbitrator in 
Los Angeles.44   
 Second, employees lose influence and power with group-action waivers because an 
employee can often only pursue her claim through group-action.  This occurs when the employee 
has a negative value claim.  Negative value claims are defined as lawsuits that are of insufficient 
value to attract qualified attorneys.45  Thus, the only recourse available is to aggregate all similar 
claims, through a group-action, such that the amount of damages at stake are enough to 
																																								 																				
38 See generally Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming Employees: How American Employers Are Using Mandatory 
Arbitration to Deprive Workers of Legal Protection, 80 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1309 (2015).  But see David Sherwyn, et 
al., Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 
1578 (2005) (arguing that employer-employee arbitration may not be unfair to the employee as “there is no evidence 
that plaintiffs fare significantly better in litigation.”). 
39 The New York Times conducted a massive exposé on the arbitration industry examining more than 25,000 
arbitrations between 2010 and 2014.  The Times also interviewed hundreds of arbitrators, lawyers, plaintiffs, and 
judges in 35 states across America.  See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a 
‘Privatization of the Justice System’, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 1, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-of-the-justice-system.html?_r
=0 (“Unfettered by strict judicial rules against conflicts of interest, companies can steer cases to friendly arbitrators.  
In turn, interviews and records show, some arbitrators cultivate close ties with companies to get business.”)   
40 Id.		
41 Id. 
42 Id.  
43 See id. The Times investigation revealed that a company’s lawyers and the arbitrators went to lunch and 
basketball games together.  Further, between 2010 and 2014, 41 arbitrators each took care of 10 or more cases for 
just one company. 
44 Id. The Times’ article goes on to note that an arbitrator ruled for a plaintiff in an employment discrimination case 
where he awarded the employee $1.7 million.  No employer ever hired that arbitrator again. 
45 E.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 
338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)) (“The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem 




compensate an attorney’s fees.  Waiving group actions effectively leaves an employer free to 
commit unlawful acts so long as the damages are individually low enough.  This, of course, is 
only likely to occur in actions where monetary damages are available, such as Rule 23(b)(3) 
actions.46   
 Third, arbitration agreements often contain confidentiality agreements that preclude 
employees from divulging their case’s facts to others.47  For example, if an arbitrator finds an 
employer’s actions unlawful, that employee is restricted from notifying her co-workers about the 
employer’s unlawful acts.  Consequently, the confidentiality agreements inherently favor the 
employer because they decrease the chance of future arbitration.  These confidentiality 
agreements clearly disempower the employee and, as discussed more fully below, isolate the 
employee from her co-workers.   
 2. Meaninglessness  
 Group-action waivers cause the employee’s world to be more unintelligible and, 
therefore, increase meaninglessness for three reasons.  First, it is likely that most employees do 
not fully understand the implications of signing the arbitration agreement.  Most employees do 
not have access to an attorney who can help navigate the legalese of these waivers and explain 
what the ramifications of the waivers are.  As a result, the employee is unlikely to know the 
advantages and disadvantages of individual arbitration.  The employee will also fail to 
understand the inherent advantages of group-actions and how unlikely it is to get attorney 
representation without group-action.   
																																								 																				
46 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2558 (2011) (“...we think it clear that individualized monetary 
claims belong in Rule 23(b)(3).”).  It should be noted that monetary relief may be awarded in Rule 23(b)(2) class 
actions so long as it is incidental to the injunction. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2557 (“[Monetary claims may not be 
certified under Rule 23(b)(2)] at least where (as here) the monetary relief is not incidental to the injunctive or 
declaratory relief.”). 
47 See Catherine L. Fisk, Collective Actions and Joinder of Parties in Arbitration: Implications of DR Horton and 
Concepcion, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 175, 198-99 (2015).	
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 Second, the coercive aspect of the mandatory waiver – an employer saying that in order 
to work at a job, an employee must sign away some of her rights – is likely confusing to an 
employee.  Work is essential to human beings.  Other than in the mandatory waiver context, 
there are few other scenarios in which a company seeks to deprive a worker of something that 
essential – a possible comparator might be if a worker’s right to sue that company is renounced.  
For the average person, the rule of law and the courts are understood to be ubiquitous entities 
with unfettered influence; city, county, state, and federal laws confront the average person daily.  
This is not to mention that movies, TV shows, media, school, and society in general tell the 
average person that she can sue an entity if that entity does something illegal.  So, to have an 
employer require that an employee relinquish that right to sue goes against these common norms 
and understanding of what rights a person should have.  The employee is subsequently confused, 
and the world becomes a bit more unintelligible.  Of course, the confusing nature depends on 
whether the employee is cognizant of the fact that she is signing away her rights with the waiver.   
 Third, by implementing a group-action waiver, the employer reinforces the notion that 
the employee is just a cog in the wheel.  To some employers, the waiver represents the ability to 
prevent meritless claims vulnerable to the group-action mechanism.  In more extreme instances, 
however, it also represents somewhat of a get out-of-jail-free card for the employer, as the 
deterrence effect of the group-action is effectively gone.  Simply put, the employer likes the 
waiver because it prevents the loss of capital, and it is easy to implement.48  In effect, these 
waivers tell the employee one of two things: Either the employer does not trust its employees 
enough to bring only valid group-action claims, or the employer just wants to protect itself when 
it commits an unlawful act.  Either way, this makes the employee-employer relationship 
																																								 																				
48 See generally Garrett D. Kennedy & Joseph A. Piesco, United States Supreme Court Reaffirms Use of Class 
Action Waivers in Arbitration Agreements: Next Stop – Employment Contracts, EMPLOYMENT ALERT, DLA PIPER 
(Dec. 18, 2015), https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/insights/publications/2015/12/us-supreme-court-reaffirms-use-of-
waivers/ (noting that waivers are a cost effective and easy way to save money). 
13 
	
impersonalized and focused on money, reinforcing the view that the employee is just another cog 
on the wheel of economic profit.  As another cog in the wheel, the employee’s role in the 
workplace has less purpose, and the future of the employee’s role in the company becomes more 
uncertain.  
3. Isolation  
 Clearly, a group-action waiver isolates employees as it prevents employees from 
gathering together to pursue an employment claim against the employer jointly.  This insulates 
the employee from other employees and from the judiciary.  Moreover, by changing the dynamic 
of the interaction with employees, the waiver serves to separate the employee from the employer.  
Instead of the dynamic being one of collaboration, the waiver creates distrust and conflict.  The 
waiver says, “as an employee, you are not a partner in this business.  Instead, you are a potential 
liability.”  This is likely to inhibit an employee from treating her employer as a part of her 
community.        
 Additionally, the confidentiality agreements often included in these arbitration contracts 
further isolate the employee.  These provisions limit the ability of an employee involved in 
arbitration from discussing any facts or conclusions found in the case.  This gag rule clearly 
reduces the amount an employee can be involved in her community and in the workplace 
because she cannot, for example, help similarly situated employees if the arbitrator found an 
employer’s actions unlawful.  
 4. Self-Estrangement   
 Because of the waiver’s capability to reduce the employee’s power, meaning, and 
community, the process of working becomes more a means to get money rather than an end in 
and of itself.  The whole basis for the waiver is to save the employer’s capital through reducing 
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negative media coverage49 and expensive lawsuits.  The intrinsic value of work is less likely to 
shine when that work is predicated on a document that emphasizes employer dominance and 
employer cost-saving measures at the expense of the loss of the right to collectively engage in a 
lawsuit.  Thus, because the waiver diminishes the inherent value of work and places the focus of 
the employment relationship on monetary gain, an employee is more likely to feel self-estranged.   
C. Employee Alienation Matters 
 This article has put forth a general theory as to how employment group-action waivers 
alienate the employee, but why should a court or government care about this issue?  This section 
lays out three reasons.  First, curing employee alienation helps to further the national labor policy 
set forth in the National Labor Relations Act. A judge should therefore consider the alienation 
analysis because alienation is grounded in U.S. labor policy.  Second, judges are invested in the 
practical effects of their decisions.  If a judge knows that her decision will result in the alienation 
of an employee, she may be less likely to rule that way.  Third, related to the second reason, 
determining the alienating effects of a certain legal interpretation helps a court find the 
“sympathetic” reading.  A sympathetic reading is particularly useful when reasonable minds 
could disagree as to the proper interpretation or reading of a certain law.   
1. Alleviating Employee Alienation Furthers the National Labor Policy 
 Employee alienation contributes to the very problems that Congress and the President 
were intent on eliminating through the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).  First, Congress 
sought to decrease industrial strife and unrest in the workplace.50  In particular, Congress spoke 
of unrest that obstructed commerce by impairing the instrumentalities of commerce and by 
																																								 																				
49	The waiver reduces negative media coverage because, as discussed above, the arbitration proceedings are private 
and often confidential.	
50 29 U.S.C.A. § 151. 
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decreasing employment and wages.51  It is easy to see how employee alienation leads to 
industrial unrest and violence52 — a powerless, isolated, estranged, unimportant worker is more 
likely to revolt against the entity causing these feelings.  
 Second, the NLRA’s intent was to restore equal bargaining power between employees 
and employers.53  In fact, the aim of the NLRA, according its chief architect, was to redistribute 
power in the workplace.54  This intent is evidenced through, among other parts of the Act, 
Section 8(a)(2).  Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA bans company-dominated unions.55  A company-
dominated union inherently shifts power away from the employee and is “incapable of providing 
workers with . . . the power necessary to forge agreements with management . . . .”56  In relevant 
part, alienation is the absence of employee power and participation – it is powerlessness.   
 Finally, the point of the NLRA was to provide employees with the right to engage in 
concerted activity to obtain mutual aid or protection.57  For example, an employee has the right 
to discuss working conditions with other employees or to attempt to gain the support of the 
media concerning the employees’ conditions of employment.  Alienation undermines this 
principle because it is isolation from other employees and other actors, both internal to the 




52 Numerous social scientists have long recognized this phenomenon.  See, e.g., ROBERT BLAUNER, ALIENATION 
AND FREEDOM: THE FACTORY WORKER AND HIS INDUSTRY 121-22 (1964) (noting that alienated auto workers keep 
their dignity through fighting authority and by participating in protests); Johanna Oresckovic, Capturing Volition 
Itself: Employee Involvement and the Team Act, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 229, 247-48 (1998) (noting that 
worker alienation has led to, among other negative consequences, “widespread labor unrest.”).  
53 29 U.S.C.A. § 151. 
54 Ken Matheny & Marion Crain, Disloyal Workers and the “Un-American” Labor Law, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1705, 
1722-23 (2004). 
55 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a)(2) (An employer violates the Act when it “dominates or interferes with the formation of a 
labor organization or contributes financial or other support for it.”). 
56 Johanna Oreskovic, Capturing Volition Itself: Employee Involvement and the Team Act, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 229, 242 (1998).   
57 29 U.S.C.A. § 157 (West) (“Employees shall have the right to...engage in...concerted activities for the purpose of 





2. Judges Care About the Practical Effects of Their Decisions 
 Judges care about doing the right thing: “Judges are curious about social reality . . .  
[T]hey want the lawyers to help them dig below the semantic surface.”58  As a result, attorneys 
and experts in legal persuasion view the policy argument — such as this article’s alienation 
argument — as central to legal advocacy.59  There are of course some legal theorists and judges 
who advocate that judges should not make decisions based on policy implications or practical 
effects but rather on a mechanical application of rules.60  Nonetheless, it is true that at least some 
judges see otherwise.61  Consequently, a study and interpretation of alienation is of importance to 
at least some judges and other adjudicators.     
3. Employee Alienation helps a Court find the “Sympathetic” Reading 
 Finally, analyzing alienation allows a court, as well as the public, to find the sympathetic 
reading when confronted with a legal issue that can be reasonably interpreted different ways.  As 
Justice Blackmun once stated, “[t]he question presented by this case is an open one, and our 
Fourteenth Amendment precedents may be read more broadly or narrowly depending upon how 
one chooses to read them.  Faced with the choice, I would adopt a “sympathetic” reading, one 
																																								 																				
58 See RICHARD POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 283 (2008). 
59 See, e.g., Ellie Margolis, Closing the Floodgates: Making Persuasive Policy Arguments in Appellate Briefs, 62 
MONT. L. REV. 59 (2001); Michael R. Smith, The Sociological and Cognitive Dimensions of Policy-Based 
Persuasion, 22 J.L. & POL'Y 35 (2013); Maureen B. Collins, A Place for Policy, 89 ILL. B.J. 543 (2001); Ken Swift, 
The Writer's Corner: Making Policy Arguments, 61 BENCH & B. MINN. 30 (2004). 
60 See Elaine Mcardle, Filling in the Gaps, HARV. L. BUL., July 1, 2008, http://today.law.harvard.edu/book-
review/filling-in-the-gaps/ (quoting Harvard Law Professor Einer Elhauge stating, “There’s a nice, popular 
conception that judges are just umpires calling balls and strikes, and that they just have to mechanically apply the 
rules.”). 
61 See, e.g., Theodore A. McKee, Judges As Umpires, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1709, 1715 (2007) (“We judges must 
resist the temptation to assume that we are beyond the reach of the forces that shape the mindsets and beliefs of our 
non-jurist peers.”); Neil S. Siegel, Umpires at Bat: On Integration and Legitimation, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 701, 
705-11 (2007) (criticizing the view that judges make decisions based only on the rules and without outside 
interference or policy preferences).  
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which comports with dictates of fundamental justice and recognizes that compassion need not be 
exiled from the province of judging.”62   
As will be discussed, the legality of group-action waivers is an open one.  A court can 
reasonably interpret the law as allowing and disallowing these waivers in the employment 
context.  The current stance of the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) and several circuit 
courts is evidence of this.  The NLRB has held in numerous cases that an employment class or 
collective action waiver violates the right to engage in concerted activity, a right protected under 
the NLRA.63  Circuit courts, on the other hand, find that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) 
requires enforcement of the waiver.64  As this article will show, group-action waivers alienate 
employees depriving them of power, meaning, community, and intrinsic pride in the workplace.  
As a result, a court should be more likely to find the NLRB’s interpretation as the sympathetic 
interpretation: group-action waivers are unlawful in the employment context.   
II. WAIVING THE RULE 23 CLASS ACTION, FLSA COLLECTIVE ACTION, AND PAGA ACTION 
ALIENATES EMPLOYEES 
This article’s central argument is that group-action waivers in employment arbitration 
agreements alienate employees.  However, the degree of alienation depends upon which group-
action mechanism an employee waives.  This section analyzes three common employment 
group-actions through the lens of alienation: Rule 23 class action waivers, FLSA collective 
action waivers, and PAGA action waivers.   
																																								 																				
62 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 212-13 (1989) (Blackmun, J. Dissenting).	
63 See, e.g., In Re D. R. Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB No. 184 (Jan. 3, 2012) (holding that group-action waivers in 
arbitration agreements violate the NLRA); Murphy Oil Usa, Inc., 361 NLRB No. 72 (Oct. 28, 2014) (reaffirming In 
Re D. R. Horton, Inc.).  The relevant language in the NLRA is derived from 29 U.S.C. § 157 (West) (“Employees 
shall have the right to . . . engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other 
mutual aid or protection . . .”).  For articles discussing the NLRB’s conflict with the circuit courts, see Michael D. 
Schwartz, A Substantive Right to Class Proceedings: The False Conflict Between the FAA and NLRA, 81 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2945 (2013) (arguing that the employee’s right to pursue class claims is a substantive right under the NLRA 
rather than a procedural right and, thus, is not in conflict with the Federal Arbitration Act).  
64 See, e.g., D.R. Horton, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013) (finding that the Federal Arbitration Act 
requires enforcement of class and collective action waivers in employment arbitration agreements); Murphy Oil 
USA, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015) (same); see also Michael H. Dell, 5th Circuit Rejects NLRB’s 
D.R. Horton Decision, 22 NO. 3 N.J. EMP. L. LETTER 3 (Jan. 2014).		
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A. Rule 23 Class Action Waiver 
To begin, it is best to understand the unique features of the Rule 23 class action before 
looking at the waiver’s alienating effects.  Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
permits a plaintiff whose lawsuit satisfies certain criteria to pursue her claim as a class action.65  
Rule 23 can be divided into two separate types of class actions: Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 
23(b)(3).66  Both have distinctive characteristics.   
Rule 23(b)(2) involves mainly injunctive relief rather than monetary damages.67  Because 
it is injunctive relief, it is slightly de-individualized – every employee affected obtains the same 
relief.  Additionally, when a class representative sues the employer under Rule 23(b)(2), the 
court is not obligated to send notice to absent class members.68  Finally, there is no requirement 
that absent class members opt-in to or opt-out of the class action.69  This adds to the de-
individualized nature of Rule 23(b)(2).   
Conversely, the Rule 23(b)(3) class action is concerned mainly with monetary relief 
rather than injunctive relief.70  Personal notice is required and so is the ability for absent class 
members to opt-out of the lawsuit.71  Also, relief can be individualized – each class member can 
receive a designated amount of money as relief.72  Finally, Rule 23(b)(3) is more difficult to 
certify than Rule 23(b)(2) because Rule 23(b)(3) requires two additional criteria be satisfied: 
																																								 																				
65 See generally Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. 
66 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2-3). 
67 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) (the rule states that “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds 
that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate 
respecting the class as a whole) (emphasis added).  See also Newberg on Class Actions § 1:3 (5th ed.) (“This 
category is typically employed in civil rights cases and other actions not primarily seeking money damages.”). 
68 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(A) (“For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2), the court may direct 
appropriate notice to the class.”).  Note that the court is not required to give notice but may if it wants.   
69 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2); Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(A) (notice that there is no requirement that potential class 
members have the opportunity to opt-out of the class action).  However, for Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, the potential 
class members must have the opportunity to opt-out.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(v).      
70 Newberg on Class Actions § 4:24 (5th ed.) (“the structure of Rule 23 generally steers money damage class actions 
into Rule 23(b)(3), with its greater procedural protections . . . .”). 
71 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). 
72 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2558 (2011) (“we think it clear that individualized monetary 
claims belong in Rule 23(b)(3).”). 
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predominance and superiority.73  Specifically, Rule 23(b)(3) requires “that the questions of law 
or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual 
members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently 
adjudicating the controversy.”74 
It is also important to note which entity created Rule 23 and the policy behind its 
creation.  The Civil Rules Advisory Committee originally created Rule 23.75  The Chief Justice 
of the U.S. Supreme Court appoints members of this committee.76  This committee consists of 
experts on civil procedure from the judiciary and academia.77  The Committee takes notice and 
comment during rulemaking when the Judicial Conference of the United States and the Supreme 
Court have the opportunity to review a proposed rule.78  Eventually, the proposed rule is sent to 
Congress.79  If Congress does nothing within a specified period, then the rule goes into effect.80  
The policy behind Rule 23 was to alleviate burdened courts, remove the risk of 
inconsistent results in different courts, secure class-wide relief for class-wide harms, and provide 
a mechanism to resolve small injuries of a large number of individuals.81  In short, Rule 23 was 
not created specifically to address employment issues. 
As discussed above, several circuit courts have found that employment Rule 23 class 
action waivers are lawful.82  However, the NLRB has found that any employment group-action 
																																								 																				
73 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 
74 Id.		
75 See generally Panel Eight: Civil Rules Advisory Committee Alumni Panel: The Process of Amending the Civil 
Rules, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 135, 137 (2004). 
76 Committee Membership Selection, UNITED STATES COURTS (last visited April 20, 2017), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process/committee-membership-selection.  




81 See Tom Ford, Federal Rule 23: A Device for Aiding the Small Claimant, 10 B.C.L. REV. 501, 504-505 (1969). 
82 See, e.g., D.R. Horton, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013) (finding that the Federal Arbitration Act 
requires enforcement of class and collective action waivers in employment arbitration agreements); Murphy Oil 
USA, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015) (same); see also Michael H. Dell, 5th Circuit Rejects NLRB’s 
D.R. Horton Decision, 22 NO. 3 N.J. EMP. L. LETTER 3 (Jan. 2014). 
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waiver is unlawful because such waivers violate the NLRA.83  However, because Congress 
empowered the federal circuit courts to enforce the NLRB’s orders, the NLRB’s legal stance 
likely has little practical effect so long as the circuit courts continue to refuse to enforce the 
NLRB’s ban of these waivers.84  While the Supreme Court has found that mandatory group-
action waivers in other contexts are lawful,85 it has yet to decide whether group-action waivers in 
the employment context are lawful.  Thus, Rule 23 class action waivers in the employment 
context are presently lawful.   
What follows is an analysis of the alienating effects of waiving these characteristics of 
Rule 23.  Similar to Section B of Part I above, this section analyzes Rule 23 under the four 
categories of alienation: powerlessness, meaninglessness, isolation, and self-estrangement.   
1. Powerlessness 
Waiving Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3) class actions decreases worker power to 
differing degrees.  Rule 23(b)(2) requires no notice and no opt-out mechanism.  Therefore, an 
absent class member loses less autonomy when Rule 23(b)(2) class actions are waived because 
she would have had less of a chance of knowing about the class action even if she had not signed 
the waiver.  It should be noted that there are instances when the media, co-workers, or other 
people put the absent class member on notice.  In practice, an absent class member of a Rule 
23(b)(2) class action does not always lose autonomy because of a lack of court notice.  On the 
																																								 																				
83 See, e.g., In Re D. R. Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB No. 184 (Jan. 3, 2012) (holding that group-action waivers in 
arbitration agreements violate the NLRA); Murphy Oil Usa, Inc., 361 NLRB No. 72 (Oct. 28, 2014) (reaffirming In 
Re D. R. Horton, Inc.).   
84 See Basic Guide to the National Labor Relations Act, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, OFFICE OF THE 
GENERAL COUNSEL (1997), https://www.nlrb.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/basic-page/node-
3024/basicguide.pdf (“If an employer or a union fails to comply with a Board order, Section 10(e) empowers the 
Board to petition the U.S. court of appeals for a court decree enforcing the order of the Board enjoining conduct that 
the Board has found to be unlawful. Section 10(l) provides that any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board 
granting or denying in whole or in part the relief sought may obtain a review of such order in any appropriate circuit 
court of appeals.”). 
85 See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (finding that class action waivers are 
enforceable in the consumer contract context even where state common law prohibits such waivers); Am. Exp. Co. v. 




other hand, because Rule 23(b)(3) class actions contain an opt-out and notice requirement, 
waiving Rule 23(b)(3) decreases employee control and power more.  The ability to opt-out is not 
significantly empowering because the court assumes the employee is already part of the class 
action.  If the employee does nothing, the case continues with her as part of the class.  The 
affirmative act of opting-in would provide much more control and power for the employee.  In 
contrast, Rule 23(b)(3)’s additional requirements of predominance and superiority make it more 
difficult to succeed in certifying the class.  Thus, an employee’s ability to influence outcomes is 
not as great.  
 2. Meaninglessness 
 Rule 23(b)(2)’s lack of notice contributes to uncertainty about future events in the 
workplace.  This is because without notice, the absent class member has no knowledge about the 
ongoing class action.86  Moreover, if the employee is not required to be fully informed about the 
class action, surely that employee’s importance and function is already decreased.  Therefore, 
waiving this right has little effect on meaninglessness.  For opposite reasons, waiving Rule 
23(b)(3)’s notice requirement decreases meaning more greatly.   
 Waiving Rule 23 class actions in general has little effect on employee meaning because 
of who created Rule 23 and why they created it.  The Civil Rules Advisory Committee, the entity 
that effectively created Rule 23, is less connected to the employee than say, the federal or a state 
government.  The Chief Justice selects the individuals on the Committee and not the people.  
Thus, an average employee cannot directly influence who is on the committee like she can 
directly influence who is in Congress or the state legislature. Further, the employee’s interests 
were not the central purpose behind Rule 23.  Recall that Rule 23’s goals were to alleviate 
burdened courts, remove inconsistency between different courts, secure class-wide relief for 
																																								 																				
86 However, even if Rule 23(b)(2) does not require notice, courts may still mandate it.  Further, an absent class 
member may know about a class action through the media, co-workers, and others.   
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class-wide harms, and resolve small injuries of a large number of individuals.  Rule 23 wasn’t 
created specifically for the employee.  Because the Civil Rules Advisory Committee is not that 
connected to the average employee, and because the Committee’s focus was not on employee 
needs, waiving Rule 23 only slightly decreases employee meaning in society; the waiver only 
barely changes the employee’s purpose and function with respect to government.   
 3. Isolation 
 Rule 23(b)(2)’s non-individualized, injunctive relief seems to add to feelings of 
community in the workplace.  For instance, say a court determines that the employer 
misclassified a class of individuals as independent contractors instead of employees.  The court 
then orders that the employer recognize the class as employees ensuring that the employer 
provide the class all the benefits of being a bona fide employee.  As a result, these individuals 
become more integrated into the workplace and more involved with each other because relief 
affects all the employees and the class.  Therefore, waiving Rule 23(b)(2) class actions limits this 
potential for community and adds to isolation.  Conversely, Rule 23(b)(3)’s focus on 
individualized relief – that is, monetary relief – puts emphasis on the individual rather than the 
community.  Waiving this inevitably has less of an effect on isolation because of this emphasis 
on individual relief. 
 Further, waiving Rule 23 in general isolates the employee from the Civil Rules Advisory 
Committee.  Although the committee has significant public input and advice, it is still more 
disconnected from the employee than, say, local and federal governments.  Accordingly, 
isolation is limited in this instance.   
 4. Self-Estrangement 
 Because Rule 23(b)(2) focuses on non-monetary ends, it seems to emphasize that work is 
not all about money.  Instead, it promotes the notion that work may be an end in and of itself and 
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have intrinsic benefits worth more than the paycheck at the end of the week.  Therefore, waiving 
(b)(2) class actions enhances self-estrangement significantly.  On the other hand, (b)(3) class 
actions are chiefly concerned with obtaining monetary relief.  This promotes the notion that work 
is predominantly about money and not necessarily about anything else.  Consequently, waiving 
(b)(3) class actions does not considerably affect self-estrangement.   
B. FLSA Collective Action Waiver 
 Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) to “eliminate labor conditions 
detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, 
efficiency, and general well-being of workers.”87  In this vein, the FLSA collective action rule 
was specifically created to help the worker.  This is in contrast to Rule 23 class actions because 
Rule 23 was implemented to cover a wide variety of legal actions.   
 The FLSA collective action contains unique components.88  It requires that an employee 
opt-in rather than opt-out.89  Thus, an employee must affirmatively decide that she wants to 
pursue the claim with her fellow co-workers – unlike a class action, the court does not assume 
she is a part of the lawsuit.  Furthermore, every employee who opts in has party status and can 
argue her claim in court.90  Similar to Rule 23(b)(3), personal notice is required.  Collective 
action also requires that the employees suing the employer be “similarly situated,” which the 
FLSA does not define.91  While some courts issuing certification resort to analyzing the 
“similarly situated” standard using the Rule 23 criteria, most courts use an ad-hoc method.92  
																																								 																				
87 29 U.S.C.A. § 202(b). 
88 See Id. at § 216(b). 
89 Id.  (“No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to become 
such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought”). 
90 See COLLECTIVE ACTIONS UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, 7B FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 1807 (3d 
ed.). 
91 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b). 
92 See Matthew Hoffman, Comment, Fast’s Four Factors: A Solution to Similarly Situated Discovery Disputes in 
FLSA Collective Actions, 49 HOUS. L. REV. 491, 502-505 (2012). 
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Arguably, this ad-hoc standard is not as difficult to satisfy than the certification criteria in both 
Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3) class actions.93   
As already discussed, there is conflict between the NLRB and the federal circuit courts as 
to the legality of any group-action waiver in the employment context, and the U.S. Supreme 
Court has not addressed this question as of yet.  However, this conflict has little practical effect 
because the circuit courts enforce the NLRB’s orders.94  As a result, the FLSA collective action 
waiver is currently lawful. 
What follows is an analysis of these components through the lens of alienation.  As with 
this article’s other analyses, this section looks at the four categories of alienation. 
1. Powerlessness 
Collective action’s opt-in requirement provides immense power to the employee.  The 
court makes no assumptions as to the employee’s choice to be a part of the lawsuit.  Instead, it 
asks the employee to tell the court that she wants to be involved with the suit.  This obviously 
provides great power to the employee – the employee has ultimate control.  As a result, waiving 
this decreases employee control and autonomy considerably.  Just as Rule 23(b)(3) requires 
notice, so does a FLSA collective action.  Waiving this collective action right obviously 
decreases the ability for an employee to influence the workplace.  Collective action requires a 
less stringent certification process, and, therefore, the employee has more power.  Finally, opted-
in employees enjoy full party status and the ability to be present in court.  As a result, the waiver 
reduces even more power by eliminating this party status.   
																																								 																				
93 Allan G. King, et al., You Can’t Opt Out of the Federal Rules: Why Rule 23 Certification Standards Should Apply 
to Opt-In Collective Actions Under the FLSA, 5 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 12-15 (2011) (describing six procedural 
differences between Rule 23 and FLSA Collective Actions that indicate that Rule 23 is more difficult to satisfy). 
94 See Part II.A.	
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The collective action waiver also indirectly steals power away from the employee.  
Congress enacted the FLSA to protect the workers from unscrupulous employers.95  The people 
(including relevant employees) elect Congress, and Congress represents the people.  Thus, the 
collective action waiver is taking power away from Congress, and, by extension, the employee.   
 2. Meaninglessness 
 By waiving the right to collective action, the worker’s outlook on her future is more 
unintelligible and less ascertainable, resulting in a loss of purpose both in the workplace and in 
society.  Common knowledge leads an average employee to assume that if she petitions her 
government to create a law (FLSA) that establishes a process that effectively protects her, an 
employer should be precluded from requiring the employee to relinquish her right to that 
process.  The waiver goes against the thought that “in America, the law is king.”96  Therefore, an 
employee’s future is indeterminable with respect to society.  “What other federal legal 
protections have I signed away?” an employee may ask.  This uncertainty extends to the 
workplace as well.  By requiring waiver of a federal law specifically designed to protect 
employees, the employer is telling the employee that she is not important to the workplace.   
 3. Isolation 
 The collective action creates community through the ability to affirmatively opt-in to a 
lawsuit and through the relative ease in satisfying the “similarly situated” requirement.  It also 
connects the worker to their federal government, as the FLSA is an act created by the U.S. 
Congress.  Consequently, waiving the collective action right not only isolates an employee from 
other employees in the workplace, but it also insulates an employee from the protections of the 
federal government.   
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 4. Self-Estrangement 
 Collective action waivers intensify self-estrangement.  This is due to the FLSA’s purpose 
of eliminating detrimental labor conditions.  This focus on helping vulnerable employees furthers 
the notion that work is more than just about a paycheck.  The workplace must also be beneficial 
to the employee in other ways.  As a result, waiving the collective action process tells an 
employee that one way to achieve those non-monetary benefits is shut off.  The practice of 
working then becomes a means simply to get by. 
C. PAGA Action Waiver 
 There are several relevant components of the PAGA action to this analysis.  First, an 
aggrieved employee brings a PAGA action on behalf of California to recover civil penalties for 
Labor Code violations.97  This effectively deputizes the employee making that employee an 
agent of the state.98  Second, the employee must provide notice to the employer and to the Labor 
and Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) containing the alleged facts and arguments 
supporting the claim.99  If the LWDA does not respond in 33 days, chooses not to cite the 
employer, or does not issue a citation after 158 days, the employee can begin the lawsuit.100  
Third, the PAGA action does not need to comply with the Rule 23 requirements of 
certification.101  Fourth, workers receive 25 percent of any penalties collected from the 
employer.102  The rest goes to the state.103  
 It is important to the alienation analysis to note which entity enacted PAGA and the 
policy behind it.  California enacted PAGA to address two primary problems that delayed 
prosecution of Labor Code violations: (1) district attorneys considered these violations a low 
																																								 																				
97 Cal. Lab. Code § 2699 (2016). 
98 Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1756, AFL-CIO v. Superior Court, 209 P.3d 937, 943 (Cal. 2009).	
99 Cal. Lab. Code § 2699.3(a)(1) (2016). 
100 Id. at § 2699.3(a)(2)(A-B). 
101 Willner v. Manpower Inc., 35 F. Supp. 3d 1116, 1136 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
102 Cal. Lab. Code § 2699(i). 
103 Id.  
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priority and (2) insufficient government resources.104  Moreover, the primary reason for PAGA is 
to deter.105   
In contrast with both Rule 23 class action waivers and FLSA collective action waivers, 
the California Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have found PAGA action waivers unlawful.  
The California Supreme Court in Iskanian found that a PAGA action waiver is contrary to public 
policy and therefore unlawful.106  Moreover, the court found that the Federal Arbitration Act 
(“FAA”) does not preempt PAGA because the Federal Arbitration Act’s (“FAA”) aim was to 
offer a forum for determination of private disputes, and PAGA is a dispute between a public 
entity and the employer.107  Almost all of the monetary penalties go to the state.108  The aim of 
the PAGA action is not to help private parties but rather to safeguard the public.109  Furthermore, 
resolving a split among the California federal district courts on this issue, the Ninth Circuit found 
PAGA action waivers unlawful for the same reasons articulated in Iskanian.110 
Like the previous inquiries, this section looks at the PAGA action through the lens of the 
four categories of alienation.   
1. Powerlessness 
The amount of power a PAGA action provides to an employee should not be understated.  
It is immense.  The employee becomes an agent and a deputy of the state charged with suing his 
employer for illegal acts.  The action, therefore, crosses out of the private realm and into the 
public realm.  Additionally, there is no complicated certification requirement, in effect making it 
																																								 																				
104 Medina v. Vander Poel, 523 B.R. 820, 825 (E.D. Cal. 2015), appeal dismissed No. 15-15301 (9th Cir. May 11, 
2015). 
105 Brown v. Superior Court, 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d 779, 790 review granted and opinion superseded sub nom. Brown v. 
S. C., 307 P.3d 877 (Cal. 2013). 
106  Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC, 327 P.3d 129, 133 (2014) cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1155 (2015). 
107 Id. at 384. 
108 Id. at 388. 
109 Id. at 386.	
110 See Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail North America, Inc., 803 F.3d 425 (9th Cir. 2015). 
28 
	
easier to bring forth a lawsuit.111  Consequently, a waiver relinquishes an enormous amount of 
power and ability to influence the workplace.  
2. Meaninglessness 
 Similar to the discussion in the powerlessness inquiry, by deputizing the employee, her 
function in society is amplified ten times over.  She now, as a deputy, represents the people of 
the state of California – all 38 million of them – and is tasked with protecting their interests.  
When a statute that specifically elevates employees to such a level of importance must be 
waived, the employee’s world is surely more unintelligible and uncertain.   
 3. Isolation 
 PAGA action waivers alienate the employee from the state government.  This isolation is 
more significant than both FLSA collective action and Rule 23 class action waivers because the 
state government is most closely linked to the employee.  The employee has an easier chance of 
affecting state politics than she does federal politics or actions of an unelected committee.   
 4. Self-Estrangement 
 PAGA actions reinforce the idea that work is satisfying for its intrinsic nature rather than 
for extrinsic motives such as money.  This is because the state collects most of the monetary 
penalties.  Accordingly, money for the employee is not the chief concern of the action.  In fact, 
PAGA actions are primarily concerned with deterrence.  Therefore, waiving PAGA actions 
contribute to the notion that work is not an end in and of itself but rather a means for something 
else like money.   
III. CONCLUSION 
This article has laid out the central contention that group-action waivers should not be 
enforced because they alienate the employee.  Waivers alienate the employee by reducing the 
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employee’s power, meaning, and community.  As a result, the employee is more likely to be self-
estranged.  Courts and society in general should care about these alienating effects because 
alleviating alienation furthers our nation’s labor policy and its goal of empowering workers.  
Moreover, examining alienation helps a court determine the practical effects of its decision and 
to find more sympathetic interpretations of a law.  Finally, the alienating effects of different 
types of group-action waivers run the spectrum.  Rule 23 class action waivers, FLSA collective 
action waivers, and PAGA action waivers all alienate the employee to different degrees.        
 Consider the hypothetical from the introduction.  Mary’s situation is similar to employees 
in the real world.112  Having effectively precluded her from the group-action process, the waiver 
leaves Mary with little recourse to lessen the effects of alienation.  She could quit her job and 
look for work elsewhere.  However, even if she could find work as a housekeeper at another 
hotel, the same problems would persist with her new employer.  Another option is to obtain 
union representation.  Assuming a union could win the support of the employees at the hotel, 
union representation could decrease alienation and help keep the hotel accountable.  As a result, 
the alienating effects of group-action waivers might be somewhat reversed or stagnated.  Most 
employers would probably greatly oppose this option.  Additionally, Mary has the option of 
going to the media.  A news media outlet may be interested in publishing a story about the bad 
working conditions at the hotel.  The news story may shame the hotel into changing its unlawful 
practices.  This might increase the power, meaning, and community of Mary and somewhat 
negate the alienating effects of the waiver.   
 Although beyond the scope of this article, a company like the hotel in Mary’s situation 
could ban group-action waivers while also implementing certain mechanisms that would keep 
the potential costly group-action lawsuit at bay.  One of these mechanisms could be workplace 
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democracy.  If all housekeepers at the hotel had a direct say in how they are treated and how 
their work is organized, a company is less likely to violate the housekeepers’ rights.  In that 
instance, employees would be less likely to file a group-action.  Moreover, the housekeepers 
might obtain more freedom through workplace democracy by receiving power, meaning, 
community, and self-actualization.   
 A company can also obtain representation from a competent attorney who cares about the 
rights and well-being of the employees.  Labor and employment laws are confusing113 and an 
employer likely does not purposely violate them.  An attorney can help a company like the hotel 
navigate the laws to ensure that it does not violate its employees’ rights. This approach would 
make it so that employees are less likely to file a group-action claim.   
 In sum, this article hopes to lead to further analysis of the alienating effects of workplace 
laws on employees.  As far as I know, this paper is the first to critically analyze how a certain 
law or legal interpretation alienates employees.  I hope it is not the last.   
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